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HASKER ON GRATUITOUS NATURAL EVIL 
David O'Connor 
In a recent contribution to this journal William Hasker rejects the idea, long 
a staple in philosophical debates over God and evil, that the existence of 
gratuitous evil is inconsistent with the existence of God. Among his argu-
ments are three to show that God and gratuitous natural evil are not mutu-
ally inconsistent. I will show that none of those arguments succeeds. Then, 
very briefly, and as a byproduct of showing this, I will sketch out how a 
potentially vexing form of the problem of God and natural evil is facilitated 
by Hasker's distinction between types of gratuitous natural evil. 
I 
In a recent article in this journall William Hasker rejects the idea that God 
and gratuitous evil are mutually inconsistent, an idea hitherto generally 
taken for granted as basic to the philosophical problem of God and evil. If 
Hasker is right, the initial burden of proof will be shifted from theism to anti-
theism, and the problem of God and evil will be transformed accordingly. 
Hasker frames his discussion in the following way, 
... [I]t seems to many to be almost self-evident that a good God 
would not allow gratuitous evil. But arguments for this con-
tention are not easy to come by, and I think it may well be possible 
to show that theism requires nothing of the sort.(24) 
Specifically, his argument is that belief in the mutual inconsistency of God 
and gratuitous evil is not just not self-evident, but false. For most of his 
paper he concentrates on the question whether gratuitous moral evil is 
inconsistent with God. Here, however, I shall discuss his arguments for 
the proposition that God and gratuitous natural evil are not inconsistent 
with one another. I will show that none of those arguments succeeds. 
II 
The concept of God in Hasker's paper is standard in classical theism, 
thus, "God" means the omnipotent, omniscient, perfect creator and sus-
tainer of the universe. The concept of gratuitous evil that Hasker uses is 
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evil "such that an omnipotent being could have prevented it without there-
by having prevented the occurrence of some greater good"2(24). While dis-
cussing certain views of William Rowe's, Hasker describes such evil as 
genuinely gratuitous evil, which he distinguishes from ostensibly gratu-
itous evil. In his words, 
Let us designate as genuinely gratuitous evils those ... evils which 
could have been prevented by an omnipotent being without losing 
any greater good. And let us use the term ostensibly graluitous 
evils to designate evils which could be prevented by God without 
thereby preventing the existence of any greater good, apart from the 
benefit God's permission of such evils may have in preventing the under-
mining of morality. (34, italics original) 
The difference between genuinely and ostensibly gratuitous natural evil, 
then, is that the former is natural evil not necessary to the occurrence of 
any greater goods whatever,(39) while the latter is natural evil that is neces-
sary to prevent the undermining of morality but that is not necessary to the 
occurrence of any other greater good. Parenthetically, in the wider litera-
ture on the problem of God and evil, gratuitous evil is standardly under-
stood as what, after Hasker, we will now call genuinely gratuitous evil. In 
the case of natural evil, then, Hasker is undertaking to show that God and 
genuinely gratuitous natural evil are not mutually inconsistent. For brevi-
ty and conciseness, let us refer to genuinely gratuitous natural evil as 
GGNE and to ostensibly gratuitous natural evil as OGNE, and for the same 
reasons let us cast Hasker's thinking in terms of possible worlds. So cast, 
Hasker's route to his conclusion is through arguments to establish that 
there is no possible world in which God, consistent with his nature or with 
his objectives in world-making, could prevent the occurrence of all GGNE. 
Hasker approaches this task in 'what if?' fashion: specifically, what if God 
did prevent all GGNE? Hasker's point is that, in any possible world W, if 
God prevented all GGNE, an outcome inconsistent with God's nature or 
goals in world-making and world-governance would result, thus that God 
could not prevent all GGNE. 
Hasker's arguments to that conclusion are divisible into two groups, the 
first consisting of two arguments that examine implications of our not 
knowing that God prevents all GGNE in W, while the second consists of a 
single argument examining implications of our knowing that God prevents 
all GGNE in W. The object of the three arguments is the same: to establish 
that God and GGNE are not mutually exclusive. I shall begin with the 
third of these arguments, namely, that God and GGNE are not mutually 
exclusive in a world where both God prevents all GGNE and we know it. 
III 
To the question, what would be the consequences if God were known to 
prevent all GGNE?, Hasker answers: 
.. .it is evident that the consequences with regard to the list of 
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goods noted above - knowledge, prudence, courage, foresight, 
cooperation, and compassion - would be rather drastic. Surely 
the motivation to acquire and/or respond in accordance with any 
or all of these goods would be greatly reduced, if not eliminated 
entirely, if we really believed that God would prevent any natural 
evils which were not essential to the realization of still greater 
goods. To be sure, we might still have some inclination to avoid 
outcomes that seemed especially distasteful to us personally -
but such an inclination would be of questionable rationality, inas-
much as by preventing those outcomes we would also be prevent-
ing the occurrence of goods which are at least equal and possibly 
greater. (39, italics origina1)3 
This is to say that, if God both prevents all GGNE in Wand we know it, 
morality is undermined in W. Thus it could not be true in W that God both 
prevents all GGNE and we know it. In essence that is Hasker's argument. 
To facilitate discussion of this argument, let us distinguish between: 
(i) God is known to prevent all GGNE in W, inasmuch as God 
is known to prevent all natural evil in W 
and 
(ii) God is known to prevent all GGNE in W, but there is still 
natural evil in W, thus what is known is that all the natural 
evil in W is necessary to the occurrence of greater goods, 
specifically, in the present context, necessary to the mainte-
nance of significant morality. Here, then, it is known that all 
the natural evil in W is OGNE, as that is defined by Hasker.4 
It is clear from his text that it is (ii), not 0), that reflects Hasker's under-
standing of what we know when we know that God prevents all GGNE in 
W. So, it is on the basis of (ii) that I shall examine his argument. As the 
greater goods that are in question in Hasker's argument are moral goods 
- courage, prudence, compassion, tolerance, and so on - let us concen-
trate only on those. 
When (ii) is true in W, Hasker thinks that in combatting and counteract-
ing the natural evil that exists in that world (namely, the OGNE remaining 
once GGNE has been prevented) - for instance, by combatting and curing 
disease, by alleviating pain and suffering, and so on - we would be pre-
venting the occurrence of those possibly greater goods for which that nat-
ural evil is necessary. As we saw Hasker put it, 'by preventing those out-
comes [i.e. instances of OGNE in Wl we would also be preventing the 
occurrence of goods which are at least equal and possibly greaterl/(39). In 
a purely logical sense Hasker is of course right. For instance, with the pres-
ence here of oxygen being a necessary condition for the occurrence here of 
fire, if I prevent oxygen from being present here I prevent the occurrence 
here of fire. By parity of reasoning, then, it would seem that, by preventing 
OGNE in W we are preventing those greater goods - courage, compas-
sion, tolerance, and so on - for whose occurrence OGNE is necessary. 
But, with regard to the connection between the existence of OGNE and the 
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occurrence of such goods, things are not what they seem, as the following 
illustration makes plain. 
Let Socrates be a person now suffering great pain from a contagious dis-
ease for which neither he nor anybody else is responsible. In short, to avoid 
confusing our discussion with issues peripheral to it, both Socrates's dis-
ease and pain are natural evils. Given that Socrates is suffering in W, 
where there is known to be no GGNE, we, knowing that, know that 
Socrates's pain is a natural evil that is ostensibly (but not genuinely) gratu-
itous. We are moved by Socrates's pain and treat it. Our intention in treat-
ing his pain is to alleviate it. Our intention and action, in short, are moral. 
Suppose we succeed, and Socrates's pain is alleviated. Being an instance of 
OGNE, Socrates's pain is a necessary condition of the occurrence of certain 
instances of such goods as courage, compassion, and so on, and so, by alle-
viating his pain - in Hasker's term, by preventing it (in the present con-
text, the prevention is of the pain's continuation) - we prevent certain 
future instances of those goods. For instance, we prevent my courageous-
ly, compassionately, prudently, heroically treating his pain tomorrow. But 
there is something very queer in describing our being moved by, and our 
treatment and alleviation of, Socrates's pain as, in Hasker's words, only 
" ... an inclination to avoid outcomes that seemed especially distasteful to 
us personally ... an inclination ... of questionable rationality, inasmuch as by 
preventing those outcomes we would also be preventing the occurrence of 
goods which are at least equal and possibly greater"(39). Where does the 
queerness lie? Here: by being moved by, treating, and alleviating (prevent-
ing) Socrates's pain as we did and with the motivation we had, we are 
instantiating precisely those greater moral goods for which, in this case, 
Socrates's pain is necessary - courage (given the known risk of conta-
gion), compassion, prudence and so on. The point admits of generaliza-
tion: preventing OGNE in cases such as the present is precisely the occur-
rence of the greater moral goods for which OGNE is necessary. Thus it is 
false to believe, simpliciter, that prevention of OGNE entails the prevention 
of those greater goods. Of course, as already observed, if we todayallevi-
ate (prevent) Socrates's suffering, we do prevent my alleviation of iUbmor-
row when it might be even worse and, accordingly, more difficuktoallevi-
ate. So, in that sense, we do prevent the occurrence of a greater good. But 
it is perverse to characterize this as only avoiding "outcomes that seemed 
especially distasteful to us personally ... (and) ... of questionable rationali-
ty." The perversity is twofold: first, if we avoid alleviating Socrates's pain 
today so that you or I can do it with greater expenditure of moral effort 
tomorrow, we are condemning Socrates to extra suffering in the meantime; 
second, every time anybody alleviates another's suffering, potentially the 
occurrence of greater moral good tomorrow is prevented. 
My argument turns on, and may be expressed in terms of, a distinction 
between two kinds of prevention. For lack of better terms I shall refer to 
these as pre-emptive prevention and responsive prevention. If, in W, 
OGNE is pre-emptively prevented, then there never is any OGNE in W. 
Thus there could be no such moral goods in that world as courage, com-
passion, fortitude, and so on. And, given God's values in world-making, 
such a world could never be actualized by God. But now consider respon-
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sive prevention. Pain and suffering occur in Wand we respond by trying 
to alleviate them, that is, by trying to prevent their continuation and future 
occurrence. But, as we saw just above, this response (and prevention if we 
are successful) is precisely the realization of the greater moral goods at 
issue, thus it is the realization of God's desideratum in world-making, name-
ly, significant morality. Furthermore, as pain and suffering are not dimin-
ishing resources, our alleviation (responsive prevention) of any specific 
instance is not the pre-emptive prevention of all future pain and suffering 
(which, in W as presently described, is future OGNE). Thus, ample oppor-
tunity is provided for future instances of courage, compassion, and so on. 
Thus Hasker's argument fails. 
At this point we may anticipate the following objection. Although it is 
true that Socrates will suffer more if we do not help him than if we do, his 
extra suffering, while a natural evil, will not be a genuinely gratuitous nat-
ural evil, for, ex hypothesi, no natural evil is GGNE. And we, knowing that 
no natural evil is genuinely gratuitous, know that Socrates's extra suffering 
is not genuinely gratuitous. Thus, and this is the point of the objection, we 
are not morally obliged to help him.s Nor, for the same reason, are we 
morally obliged to ever help anybody who is suffering. And so, the objec-
tion concludes, Hasker is right when he says 
Surely the motivation to acquire and/or to respond in accordance 
with any or all of these goods [knowledge, prudence, courage, 
foresight, cooperation, and compassion] would be greatly 
reduced, if not eliminated entirely, if we really believed that God 
would prevent any natural evils which were not essential to the 
realization of still greater goods. (39, italics original) 
Let us examine this objection. In the situation as described, our choice is 
between helping and not helping Socrates who is suffering. As described, 
the situation is one in which we must choose and in which, whatever we 
do, we either help him or not. The options before us bring two possible 
successor-worlds to W into prospect, WI and W2, one alone of which will 
be set in process by our choice and action. W becomes WI when we help 
Socrates, and W becomes W2 when we do not. The subsequent histories of 
these two possible worlds will diverge, but, notwithstanding any and all 
differences, WI and W2 share an interesting ontological feature, namely, 
neither one contains any GGNE. The thinking reflected in the objection is 
that our knowing they are alike in that ontological respect means there is 
no significant moral difference between our options as we confront the suf-
fering Socrates. But that is false. Let us see why. 
In choosing, all we know for sure is that, whether we help Socrates or not, 
there will be no GGNE. This knowledge is the pivot of the objection that is 
before us. Now, if this piece of knowledge were the sole, or overwhelmingly 
the most important, factor relevant to the choice we must make, there would 
be something to the objection. But in fact this piece of knowledge is neither. 
Indeed it is arguably the case that our knowledge there will be no GGNE, 
whichever option we choose, is neutral between the two options. The reason 
for thinking this is the following. On the one hand there is the idea that, 
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because we know no GGNE will result from our not helping Socrates we are 
not obligated to help him, that we may, in good conscience, ignore his plight, 
even though we know he will have to endure extra suffering that we could 
have prevented. But, on the other hand, there is the idea that, because we 
know that, if we help him, we run no risk of inadvertently causing him (or 
anybody else) gratuitous harm, a possible inhibitor of our helping him is 
removed, namely, the fear that we might unintentionally cause him needless 
suffering. In my view the latter idea is at least as plausible as the former. If I 
am right about this, there is at least rough equality between, on the one 
hand, the tendency of our knowledge that there will be no GGNE to discour-
age our helping Socrates and, on the other, the tendency of that knowledge 
to encourage our helping him. If I am right about this, that knowledge is not 
a decisive factor. The question then is what factors, if any, are decisive. The 
following items are, and establish that, in the situation as described, our 
moral obligation is to help Socrates. . 
Notwithstanding the fact that there is no GGNE in either WI or W2, and 
notwithstanding the fact that, in W2, Socrates' suffering is not gratuitous, 
Socrates (as well as everybody else) can still be harmed, and harmed more 
in one world than in the other. There being no GGNE in either world does 
not entail that Socrates's (or anybody's) lot will be equally happy in both. 
Furthermore, from the fact that there is no GGNE in either world it does 
not follow that there is not more natural evil overall in one than the other. 
In W2 we do not help Socrates, despite his suffering and our ability to help 
through prevention of his extra suffering. Suppose now that our failure to 
help Socrates is not just an ad hoc omission but instead that it reflects a 
maxim we live by: never help anybody in pain, for no pain is genuinely 
gratuitous natural evil. In W2, then, we do not exercise or develop those 
moral goods in question. Suppose now we are theists, thus committed to a 
life of trust in God and of doing God's will as we understand it. On the 
subject of what, in world-making, God wants to achieve, Hasker tells us 
that u •.. the maintenance of significant morality is a1l overriding concem in 
the divine governance of the world ... "(36). But surely a world with signifi-
cant morality is a world in which human beings do give preference to act-
ing compassionately, prudently, charitably, courageously, and so on over 
not acting in those ways. In short, with the maintenance of significant 
morality being an overriding concern of God's in world-making and 
world-governance, God would want any world containing human beings 
to be a world with the best possible ratio of prudence, tolerance, compas-
sion, courage, selflessness, and so on to imprudence, intolerance, un-com-
passion, cowardice, selfishness, and so on. 
In now drawing together those factors I set forth above - knowledge 
that, despite the non-existence of GGNE, there can be, and prima facie is, 
more natural evil in one possible world than another, knowledge that 
Socrates, like any sentient being, can be harmed more in one possible 
world than another, knowledge that, prima facie, he is harmed more in W2 
than in WI, knowledge that, if we are theists, God's will is that we prac-
tice and develop those moral virtues mentioned - we find them con-
verging to show that our moral duty is to help Socrates and to not ignore 
his suffering. 
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In both drawing and buttressing this conclusion about what is the right 
thing to do in the Socrates situation, as described, it is worth noting 
Hasker's quotation of the following lines from William Frankena's Ethics, 
[M]oral reasons consist of facts about what actions, dispositions, 
and persons do to the lives of sentient beings, including beings 
other than the agent in question, and the moral point of view is 
one which is concerned with such facts. 6 
Hasker then continues in his own voice, as follows: 
This claim of Frankena's is not uncontroversial, but it seems to 
me that it enjoys strong intuitive support. Frankena's princi-
pIe ... say[s] that morally relevant reasons must ill some cmy have to 
do with the tendency of the action in question, or the class of 
actions of that kind, to do good or harm to sentient beings. And it 
seems to me that this is correct - that if we become convinced 
that certain ostensibly moral requirements or prohibitions have no 
connection whatever with the weal or woe of any rational or sentient 
being, then we soon cease to regard such commands or prohibi-
tions as morally serious. 
If this principle of Frankena's is correct, it establishes a very 
close connection between the notion of a morally wrong action and 
the idea of harm to some person or other sentient being. And this, 
in turn, suggests two requirements which must be met in the lives 
of persons who have significant obligations towards others. First 
of all, it must be possible for these persons to act in ways that are 
significantly harmful to themselves and others ... Furthermore, 
they must be able to know that it is possible for them to act harm-
fully ... (28-29, italics original). 
I agree with Hasker about Frankena's principle, and I emphasize that, in the 
Socrates test-case before us, both of Hasker's requirements for a morally 
wrong action are met, namely, the possibility of harming others and knowl-
edge of that possibility. Thus, knowing all that we know in the situation as 
described, if we fail to help Socrates, we are harming him, notwithstanding 
our knowledge of the fact that there is still no GGNE in W2. Thus, in ignor-
ing his extra suffering, we are committing a morally wrong action. Thus the 
objection to my argument fails. The objection defeated, let us return to our 
discussion of Hasker's argument that God and GGNE are not mutually 
exclusive in a world where both God prevents all GGNE and we know it. 
Hasker's argument to that conclusion is open to a different objection. For 
the sake of argument let us agree with him that, in world-making and world-
governance, God's overriding concern is the maintenance of significant 
morality. In W, then, that is God's overriding concern. In W, as now 
hypothesized, we know that no natural evil is genuinely gratuitous, that all 
natural evil is necessary to the occurrence of greater moral goods. Thus, in 
W, unless we respond morally to OGNE, God's goal in actualizing W - the 
maintenance in it of significant morality - cannot be met. For, while OGNE 
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is necessary for the occurrence of those greater goods in question here, it is 
not sufficient for their occurrence. Furthermore, knowing what we know, 
we know that, without our responding to OGNE in a certain way, God's 
goal could not be met. Thus we know that in W, our responding to OGNE 
in a certain way really matters, that it has important consequences. Would 
not that knowledge enhance our motivation to respond to OGNE in that 
way? It seems to me clear that the answer is yes, inasmuch as we would not 
believe that, in the big scheme of things, our responding compassionately, 
courageously, prudently, tolerantly, gently, and so on does not amount to 
anything. Now it is a clear fact of our experience that a belief in the point-
lessness or futility or inevitable failure of our action is a serious inhibitor of 
motivation to act. But in W, knowing what we would know, our motivation 
would not be inhibited in that way at all. Thus, contrary to Hasker, our 
moral motivation would not be sapped: arguably it would be strengthened. 
Before switching to his two other arguments, a final thought on our 
knowing that, in W, there is no genuinely gratuitous natural evil. Is not 
such a world significantly akin to the actual world as the actual world is 
understood by the theist? That is, is it not a central precept of theism that 
in the actual world, notwithstanding its seeming to be genuinely gratu-
itous, all natural evil is really necessary to the occurrence of some balanc-
ing or greater good, that is, that all natural evil is really only ostensibly gra-
tuitous, and so justified in a God-made world? Hasker seems to agree that 
this is a standard theistic belief, albeit one he thinks both unnecessary and 
unhelpful to theism, but, up till now, standard nonetheless. In his words, 
" .. .it seems to many [presumably theists included] to be almost self-evi-
dent that a good God would not allow gratuitous evil"(24). That is, the 
theist believes both that God and gratuitous evil are mutually exclusive 
and that, in fact, there is no gratuitous evil in the world. But the theist, 
believing that, in the final analysis, all natural evil is OGNE, is not robbed 
of motivation to acquire, or respond in accordance with, moral goods. 
Nor, as my arguments have shown, should he be. The obvious question to 
Hasker, though, is whether it is an intended consequence of his position 
that theists' moral motivation rests on a mistake? 
IV 
Let us now take up Hasker's two other arguments on the subject of God 
and gratuitous natural evil. Unlike the argument discussed in the previous 
section, the presumption in each of these arguments is that we do not know 
that all natural evil is OGNE, although it is. According to Hasker, this 
ignorance preserves our motivation to acquire moral goods, thus, in the 
possible world under consideration, this ignorance is of great importance 
to God. However, Hasker argues, our being and remaining ignorant of all 
natural evil's being OGNE in W would necessitate a certain strategy on 
God's part, a strategy whose principal component would be a disinforma-
tion campaign (39). But, he continues, it would be impossible for God to 
engage in such a campaign, as it would be simultaneously "morally dubi-
ous in itself" (39) and at cross-purposes with one of God's chief aims in cre-
ating rational beings (39). Thus Hasker concludes that God, consistent 
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with his nature or with his goals in world making, could not engage in 
such a campaign. Thus we would not remain ignorant of the fact that God 
(pre-emptively) prevents all GGNE in W. Thus, on the argument of 
Hasker's we considered in the previous section, morality would be under-
mined. Thus, again, God could not prevent all GGNE in W, leaving only 
OGNE. Thus God and GGNE are not mutually inconsistent. 
The key to both of these arguments - the first leading to the conclusion 
of moral dubiousness, the second leading to the cross-purposes conclusion 
- is Hasker's assumption that, to assure our ignorance of his prevention of 
GGNE in W, God would have to pursue a strategy involving a disinforma-
tion campaign. Let us, then, examine that assumption. The assumption 
turns on the idea that, if God prevents GGNE in W, we will, in the normal 
course of events, know it, that is, it would be unnatural for us to not know 
it. As Hasker sees it, then, a possible world in which God prevents all 
GGNE will be, in its essentials, the possible world I shall call W3. W3 is a 
possible world in which the development and maintenance of significant 
morality is an overriding concern of God's: in it there is the same amount, 
variety and distribution of moral evil as in the actual world, and likewise 
the same amount, variety, and distribution of both OGNE and GGNE as in 
the actual world, assuming that the actual world does in fact contain 
GGNE. That is, to begin with, W3 is the actual world in respect of evil. 
Then God removes all the GGNE from W3 and prevents its recurrence. In 
removing GGNE from W3 God would be removing a large and significant 
amount of natural evil and so naturally, if events ran their normal course, 
we, the inhabitants of W3, would notice the absence of GGNE - how 
could we not? - and so would come to know that all natural evil is only 
OGNE. However, events do not run their normal course in W3, for God 
intervenes to prevent our knowing about his removal of GGNE. This inter-
vention is the disinformation campaign. 
The focus of my challenge to this argument is its central idea, namely, 
that, unless God prevents us by means of disinformation, we will know 
that God has prevented all GGNE. Here is a counter-example of a possible 
world, containing all the relevant divine desiderata that apply to both W3 
and the actual world, but necessitating no disinformation campaign to con-
ceal the fact that God has prevented all GGNE. Let us refer to this possible 
world as W4. W4 is a possible world in which the development and main-
tenance of significant morality is an overriding concern of God's: there is 
no, and never was any, GGNE, as, from the start, God pre-emptively pre-
vented GGNE in W4. However, W4 does contain the same amount, vari-
ety and distribution of both moral evil and OGNE as both W3 and the 
actual world. We, the inhabitants of W4, never know that there is no 
GGNE in W 4, nor is there any good reason to think that, in the normal run 
of things, we would ever discover it, for, in W4, things being the way they 
are would be perfectly natural to us.7 In W4 God does not inform us that 
he has prevented GGNE, just as, for instance, in the actual world God 
keeps us in the dark about the origin and ultimate fate of the actual world, 
and there is nothing morally shady about God's silence on any of these 
matters. W4, then, is a possible world in which all GGNE is prevented by 
God and in which we, without benefit of disinformation or any other kind 
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of deceit, do not know it. In W4 we would be as morally motivated as we 
are in the actual world, which is to say that morality in W4 would be no 
more undermined than it is in the actual world. 
With W3 and W4 in mind, let us go back to Hasker's argument. Hasker 
is right that God could not actualize W3, for God, consistent with his 
nature, could not engage in deception. But from the fact that God could 
not actualize W3 it does not follow that God could not, without deception, 
actualize a world without GGNE but with full provision for significant 
morality, for God could actualize W4 (or the actual world, if the actual 
world contains no GGNE)." Thus, in a world where all GGNE had been 
prevented, the dilemma Hasker foresees and on which his argument is 
predicated, namely, divine deception or no significant morality, is a false 
dilemma. Thus Hasker's argument fails. 
The second of Hasker's two arguments predicated on our not knowing 
that God prevents all GGNE is that, in actualizing a world in which we do 
not know God prevents all GGNE, God would be undermining one of his 
own chief purposes in creating rational beings, namely, that those beings 
should come to knowledge of God, including knowledge that, as theism 
standardly tells it, "it is just because God is an omnipotent, omniscient, 
wholly good being that there cannot be [GGNE]"(39, italics original). 
Hasker thinks this because of his assumption that it is only by deceit that 
we can be kept from knowing that God has prevented all GGNE. The con-
junction of these two points is that God would be in the impossible posi-
tion of simultaneously wanting us to know and not know that he prevents 
all GGNE. So, as acting at cross purposes is an outcome of the disinforma-
tion campaign, God could not engage in any such campaign. But then we 
would know both that there was no GGNE and that all natural evil was 
OGNE, and, knowing this, we would be robbed of moral motivation (or so 
the argument of Hasker's that we considered in Section III tells it). 
In response I shall make two points. First, 1f God does prevent us know-
ing he has prevented GGNE, then of course Hasker is right: God would be 
acting at cross purposes. But, in being predicated on the idea that God 
would have to prevent our coming to know he had prevented all GGNE, 
Hasker's present argument is committed to a conception such as W3. But, 
as we saw, with W4 and the actual world (assuming they are different) 
available as better alternatives, W3 is not a possible world that God could 
actualize. Hence this argument of Hasker's is undermined. Second, as we 
have already seen, given the availability of a possible world such as W4, all 
that would be required of God to insure our not knowing that he had pre-
emptively prevented the occurrence of GGNE would be an uninformation 
campaign, and there is nothing morally dubious in that. So, consistent with 
his perfect goodness, having actualized W4, God could remain silent about 
it without moral shadiness. The relevance of this point to the present argu-
ment is now this: with God remaining silent about his prevention of GGNE, 
we, the inhabitants of W4, would be in precisely the same position with 
respect to God's desire that we should come to know him, including the fact 
that, from his nature, he prevents GGNE, as are we, the inhabitants of the 
actual world. Thus, in actualizing either W4 or the actual world, God 
would not be acting at cross purposes, and so Hasker's third argument fails. 
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It might be thought that Hasker's position can be saved after all. As fol-
lows. With all natural evil in W being OGNE, no natural evil in W is incon-
sistent with God or with W's being a God-made world. For, with all the nat-
ural evil in W being necessary to the occurrence of greater goods, there is a 
morally sufficient reason for God to permit all the natural evil that there is in 
W. With that being so, might not the following defense of Hasker's position 
be made? That, in granting OGNE in W to be consistent with God, I grant 
Hasker his case, namely, that God and gratuitous natural evil are not mutu-
ally inconsistent. But that defense, if made, would fail, for that conclusion, if 
drawn, would be unjustified. For OGNE is ostensibly gratuitous natural evil, 
that is, natural evil that seems to be gratuitous but which, in fact, is not, for it 
is evil that is necessary for the occurrence of some greater good. Thus it is 
not gratuitous, really or genuinely gratuitous, at all. It is only gratuitous nat-
ural evil manque. And so Hasker's position cannot be saved in this way. 
VI 
Hasker maintains, assuming for the sake of argument that he is successful 
in showing that genuinely gratuitous moral evil is not inconsistent with God, 
that he is not obliged to succeed with regard to genuinely gratuitous natural 
evil (38). But, even if he is successful with regard to genuinely gratuitous 
moral evil, he must still succeed with GGNE. Briefly, the reason is this. 
While the problem of evil comes in many versions, each of those versions, 
broadly speaking, is articulated in either a quantified or an unquantified 
form. The argument is put in unquantified form when what is maintained is 
that no evil is compatible with God, and it is in quantified form when the 
claim is that some specific type(s) or token(s) of evil are incompatible with 
God. Success in defense is measured in proportion to the argument (or 
attack) being defended against. That is a truism, but it is an important tru-
ism. Thus, in the former case, a successful defense is able to show that some 
evil is not incompatible with God, while in the latter case a successful 
defense is able to show that whatever type or token of evil is at issue is not 
incompatible with God. But a successful defense against the former does not 
entail success against the latter, nor, within the scope of the latter, does suc-
cess with one type or token entail success with another. So, even if he suc-
ceeds with regard to genuinely gratuitous moral evil, in order to succeed 
against the quantified form of the argument from evil, Hasker must still 
show that GGNE is not incompatible with God. Success with one, assuming 
he has succeeded, does not give him a free ride on the other." Although nei-
ther of them refers to it as the quantified form of the argument from evil both 
Swinburne and Hick emphasize that it is in its quantified form that the argu-
ment from evil is most vexing.'" 
VII 
Hasker's distinction between GGNE and OGNE unintendedly provides 
anti-theism with a somewhat new, prima facie vexing, formulation of the 
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argument from evil. As follows. We have seen that W3 is not a world that 
God, consistent either with his nature or his objectives in world-making, 
could actualize. That leaves W4 and the actual world, still assuming they 
are different. The possibility of significant morality is equally viable in 
each, as is our ability to come to knowledge of God. If W4 and the actual 
world are different, then, in our present context, the only significant differ-
ence between them is the absence from the former, and the presence in the 
latter, of genuinely gratuitous natural evil. But, if these two worlds are dif-
ferent in this way, then, given the availability and attractiveness of W4, 
given its full provision for all the relevant divine desiderata in world-mak-
ing, the anti-theist can be expected to challenge theism to defend against 
the point that, in these circumstances, the existence of God is inconsistent 
with the existence of the actual world. As, prima facie, the actual world 
does contain genuinely gratuitous natural evil, the challenge would appear 
to be powerful. ll 
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NOTES 
1. William Hasker, "The Necessity of Gratuitous Evil," Faith and 
Philosophy, Vol. 9, No.1 Gan. 1992), pp. 23-44. This being both the only work of 
Hasker's I shall cite and a work cited frequently, I shall incorporate my refer-
ences to it in my text. 
2. I doubt that Hasker's definition is either complete or uncontroversial. 
For instance, we might, with profit, understand gratuitous evil as evil not nec-
essary to the possibility of the occurrence of some greater good. Throughout this 
paper, however, I shall put this reservation aside and stick to Hasker's defini-
tion. Indeed, this paper is set entirely on Hasker's terms. 
3. Two points are worth making here. First, as neither Hasker's argument 
nor my counter-argument turns upon a distinction between our knowing/not 
knowing something as opposed to our believing/not believing it, I shall use 
the verb "to know" as my only epistemic verb here. This is no disservice to 
Hasker, for, (i) he also mostly uses only that verb as his epistemic verb and (ii) 
when he uses other epistemic terms instead, e.g. "really believe," it is clear that 
the substitution is not done for the purpose of downgrading the intended epis-
temic claim from knowledge to mere belief. See p. 39. Second, among the 
moral goods that Hasker thinks we would be robbed of motivation to acquire, 
if we knew that all the natural evil in W were OGNE, is knowledge, presum-
ably the kind of knowledge necessary for moral choice to be possible. But that 
is false. For, even with no GGNE in W, there would still be ample evils from 
experience of which we could acquire the knowledge necessary for moral 
development, as there would be no less moral evil and OGNE in W than in the 
actual world. And there is no shortage of either in either of those worlds. On 
this see my "Swinburne on Natural Evil from Natural Processes," International 
Journal for Philosophy of Religion, Vol. 30, No.2 (1991), pp. 77-89. 
4. The implication in both (i) and (ii) is that we know God exists. Richard 
Swinburne has an argument that we would be robbed of moral motivation if 
we knew for sure that God existed. But it is not the same as the argument of 
Hasker's we are now considering, for Hasker's does not turn upon our know-
ing that God exists. See Swinburne's The Existence of God (New York: Oxford 
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University Press, 1979), pp. 211-12. For a counter-argument, see my 
"Swinburne on Natural Evil," Religious Studies, Vol. 19, No.1 (1983), pp. 68-71. 
5. I express my point here in the language of moral obligation. But essen-
tially the same point will hold if, instead of such language, we use terms like 
"moral decency," "moral indecency," "moral indifference," "callousness," 
"good samaritanism," "bad samaritanism," and so on, that is, terms less imme-
diately connotative of requirements and prohibitions than the terminology of 
obligations. 
6. William K. Frankena, Ethics, 2nd edition (Englewood Cliff: Prentice-
Hall, 1973), p. 113. 
7. See Section III of my "On the Problem of Evil's Still Not Being What It 
Seems," The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 40, No. 158 (Jan. 1990), pp. 76-78 and 
the second part ("The Suppression Model") of Section III of my "On Failing to 
Resolve Theism-versus-Atheism Empirically," Religious Studies, Vol. 26, No.1 
(March 1990), pp. 99-101 for a fuller account of W4. 
8. Two points come up here. The first concerns the relationship between 
W4 and the actual world. Theism's standard view, as I understand it and as I 
have stated in this paper, is (1) there could be no GGNE in a God-made world 
and (2) there is no GGNE in the actual world, appearances to the contrary 
notwithstanding. The conjunction of (1) and (2), predicated of the actual 
world, does not make the actual world and W4 one and the same, even though 
there is no GGNE in W4, for, to my knowledge, it is not a standard credendum 
of theism that there is no GGNE in the actual world because God pre-emptive-
ly prevented it. Rather, my understanding of the standard theistic view of the 
matter is that, all things considered, there is no GGNE in the actual world 
because, in the future, God will responsively prevent all GGNE. Thus the 
mechanism of prevention of GGNE might be different in W4 and the actual 
world, assuming that, in the latter, it is true that there is no GGNE. Here I shall 
not get into any discussion of which mechanism, overall, might be the better. I 
shall not address either whether natural evil that God responsively prevents is 
thereby natural evil that is justified. But, prima facie, as theism standardly con-
cedes, the actual world contains GGNE, and on the strength of this point I 
sketch, in Section VII below, a possible challenge to theism. 
The second point to address here is this. If there is no GGNE, but we do not 
know there is no GGNE, and if the non-existence of GGNE is so clearly a cre-
dendum of theism as I have been saying it is, and as Hasker seems to agree it is 
(see p. 24), why do we not know there is no GGNE? Perhaps the best answer is 
analogical. Our not knowing there is no GGNE is akin to our not knowing the 
world is God-made, or that human beings are God's creatures. These are cen-
tral precepts of theism too, but the theist does not know them to be true, when 
knowledge is understood as some form of justified, true, undefeated belief. Of 
course, a different conception of knowledge could lead to a different outcome. 
But this too is a topic too large for discussion here. 
9. See my "On the Problem of Evil's Not Being What It Seems," The 
Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 37, No. 149 (1987), pp. 441-47 for more on differ-
ences between the quantified and unquantified formulations of arguments 
from evil. 
10. See Swinburne, op.cit., p. 219 and John Hick, Evil and The God of Love 
(New York: Harper & Row, 1978), Chapter XVII. 
11. I am grateful to my colleague, Gerard J. Dalcourt, for valuable criticisms 
of an early draft of this paper, and to an anonymous referee for Faith and 
Philosophy for penetrating criticisms of the penultimate draft. The final product 
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